

10 May 1977

NOTE FOR:

[REDACTED]  
D/DCI/IC

STAT

FROM :

[REDACTED]  
D/OPEI

STAT

SUBJECT : Mr. Lehman's Comments on PRM-11  
Paper, "Roles of the DCI"

Here, at least, is one very favorable response to the subject paper -- although its source will not earn any credibility with DOD.

I forward it to call your attention to the reference on the bottom of Page 1 (top of Page 2) to NIE 11-3/8-76 and the recent Stevenson Subcommittee critique of the "B" Team business.

Why is it we do not hear about such episodes as Brown's careful reading and high regard for this NIE?

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Attachment:

ADD/DCI/NI Comments on  
PRM-11 Overview Paper

7  
[REDACTED]

INFORMATION

4 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Director, Office of Performance, Evaluation & Improvement

SUBJECT: Comments on Your Paper: "Roles of the DCI"

1. We find your draft first-rate. You have compressed doctrine, practice, and diagnosis into a lucid, and by the standards of its kind, brief account. I say this as one who has read all the papers since the beginning of time. This is both a compliment and a warning! You should test the paper on someone quite unfamiliar with these problems, to see if it is equally lucid to him.

2. The suggestions which follow are intended to strengthen certain passages, but I have also wasted a few spears on familiar windmills.

Page 11. Here under a I would note that DIA, INR, etc., have to give first priority to their own departmental consumers at some cost to their national contribution. This would lead in b to an addition that CIA's role is also justified by its being the only organization that is in a position to put national needs over departmental ones. Finally I would add an additional principle, that the purpose of collection is to support production. From this it would follow that the system must include means by which collection is fully responsive to producer and consumer needs, however difficult this task turns out to be in practice.

Page 14, top. If you discuss the desirability of decentralization in processing, should you not give even greater weight to the desirability of competition in production (where appropriate)?

Page 24. It gives me grief to see the conventional wisdom in regard to "what's wrong with" NIEs reproduced yet again without any balancing judgment. As you know,

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I believe much of this criticism comes from people who have an axe to grind or who are opposed to our insouciant approach to the consumer. "Please tell us how poorly we are serving you." For instance, we are faced today with a situation in which the observations of one half-baked young staffer on NIE 11-3/8-76 become graven in stone as an omission of the Senate Select Committee, while the fact that Harold Brown spends two nights reading the same estimate, passes out copies at the NSC, and urges each member to read the full paper goes totally unheeded by those who make a living out of criticism.

Pages 36-37. I hope that the paragraph bridging these two pages will remain intact in the final draft.

Page 62. It might be worth noting that there are also pressures to divorce the National Intelligence staff from CIA, but that the staff's dependence on integration with the DDI has so far been an effective countervailing argument.

Page 64, top. Everything you say is correct, but it would be well to note that as compared with, say, 16 years ago the improvement in interdirectorate relations has been substantial indeed.

Page 66. The existence of the National Intelligence staff tends to conceal from the user the vital importance of CIA to the national production effort. Similarly, the existence of the IC Staff masks the key role of the Agency in many other activities. To those in CIA, this sometimes seems to be an effort to pretend that CIA did not exist, while expecting it to do even more work and then to justify its activities to yet another layer of staff. This is the root cause of CIA's "identity crisis."


Page 70. Over-control of raw intelligence is especially damaging to analysis itself. This thought is implicit, but should be emphasized.

Page 94. The tendency described in g may indeed exist, but I have never encountered it once there was any evidential suggestion that deception was being attempted.

Page 100. You are too kind to the SIGINT Committee. With due recognition to the Sisyphean nature of its task, it nevertheless is seen by producing agencies as NSA's device for protecting itself from effective Community guidance.

of the intermediate stage, prior to the outbreak of war. On political decisionmaking, it should not be dominated by military needs if hope remains of avoiding war.

Page 105 This passage might end with the thought that this problem needs to be resolved. We have allowed the present indeterminate situation to continue too long.

  
Richard Lehman  
Associate Deputy Director  
to the DCI for  
National Intelligence

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-3-

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